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Abstract
We consider a problem of finding optimal contracts in continuous time, when the
agent’s actions are unobservable by the principal, who pays the agent with a one-time
payoff at the end of the contract. We fully solve the case of quadratic cost and separable
utility, for general utility functions. The optimal contract is, in general, a nonlinear
function of the final outcome only, while in the previously solved cases, for exponential
and linear utility functions, the optimal contract is linear in the final output value.
In a specific example we compute, the first-best principal’s utility is infinite, while it
becomes finite with hidden actions, which is increasing in value of the output. In the
second part of the paper we formulate a general mathematical theory for the problem.
We apply the stochastic maximum principle to give necessary conditions for optimal
contracts. Sufficient conditions are hard to establish, but we suggest a way to check
sufficiency using non-convex optimization.
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1 Introduction
This paper builds a general theory of optimal contracts between two parties in continuous
time when the action of one party is not observable. In most existing continuous-time models
of this type it is assumed that the parties have exponential utility functions, while we allow
general utility functions.
In economics literature, these type of problems are known as Principal-Agent problems,
with a principal who hires an agent to perform a certain task by controlling a given stochastic
process. For example, shareholders hire a company executive whose effort has an effect on
the company’s stock price, or investors hire a portfolio manager to manage their wealth
from investments. In a previous paper, Cvitanic´, Wan and Zhang (2006), we study the
case in which the actions of the agent are observed by the principal, the so-called first-best
case. Here, we consider the second-best case of “hidden actions” or “moral hazard”, in
which the agent’s control of the drift of the process is unobserved by the principal. Thus,
it is harder (more expensive) for the principal to provide incentives to the agent in order
to make her apply high effort. The seminal paper on this topic in the continuous-time
framework is Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), which showed that if both the principal and
the agent have exponential utilities, then the optimal contract is linear. Schattler and Sung
(1993) generalized those results using a dynamic programming and martingales approach
of Stochastic Control Theory, and Sung (1995) showed that the linearity of the optimal
contract still holds even if the agent can control the volatility, too. A nice survey of the
literature is provided by Sung (2001).
Our model is similar to those papers, but we obtain further results also for non-exponential
utility functions. We use a so-called weak formulation, meaning that the agent, with her ac-
tions, influences the distribution of the outcome process, or, more precisely its rate of return.
This approach is first suggested by Mirrlees (1974, 1976), as explained nicely in Holmstrom
(1979), p77. We will illustrate this approach first in a simple single-period model.
Different variations and applications of the problem are considered in Detemple, Govin-
daraj and Loewenstein (2001), Hugonnier and Kaniel (2008), Ou-Yang (2003), Sannikov
(2004), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Williams (2004), Sung (2005), Biais, Mariotti, Plantin
and Rochet (2007). See also Mu¨ller (1998, 2000), and Hellwig and Schmidt (2003). The
paper closest to ours is Williams (2004). That paper uses the stochastic maximum principle
to characterize the optimal contract in the principal-agent problems with hidden informa-
tion, in the case without volatility control. It focuses on the case of a continuously paid
reward to the agent, while we study the case when the reward is paid once, at the end of the
contract. Moreover, we prove our results from the scratch, thus getting them under weaker
conditions. (Williams (2004) also deals with the so-called hidden states case, which we do
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not discuss here.) A very nice paper with a setting in which the payment to the agent is
continuous is Sannikov (2007). That paper has a risk-neutral principal, and the agent has
an arbitrary utility function.
While working on the general theory, we have been able to identify a special framework
in which the problem is tractable even with general utility functions: under the assumption
of a cost function which is quadratic in agent’s effort and under a separable utility, we
find an explicit solution for the contract payoff. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first time that the optimal second-best lump-sum contract payoff is explicitly described in
a continuous-time contracting problem with hidden action, other than for exponential and
linear utilities. The solution depends only on the final outcome (usually in a nonlinear
way), and not on the history of the controlled process, the fact which was known before for
exponential and linear utilities. The contract is determined from an equation which extends
the classical Borch rule for marginal utilities of the first-best contract. It is an increasing
function of the final value of the output, thus in the spirit of real-life contracts, such as call
option contracts in executive compensation. While the optimal payoff is explicitly given as a
solution to a nonlinear equation, the agent’s optimal effort is obtained as a part of a solution
to a “simple” Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE), which, in a Markovian
framework, boils down to solving a linear parabolic PDE, a standard heat equation.
In a concrete example that we compute, with risk-neutral principal (linear utility) and
risk-averse agent (logarithmic utility), the effort is an increasing function of the current value
of the output. Interestingly, the first-best case for that example leads to infinite utility for
the principal.
For the general theory, we provide a detailed discussion on how to check whether the
necessary conditions we find are also sufficient. In particular, this is true for the separable
utility case Our method is based on studying the agent’s “value function”, that is, her
remaining expected utility process. In continuous-time stochastic control literature this
method is known at least since Davis and Varaiya (1973). In dynamic Principal-Agent
problems in discrete-time, it is used, among others, in Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986),
(1990), and Phelan and Townsend (1991).
The theory for general non-separable utility functions is quite hard. If the necessary
conditions determine a unique control process, then, if we proved existence of the optimal
control, we would know that the necessary conditions are also sufficient. The existence of an
optimal control is hard because, in general, the problem is not concave. It is related to the
existence of a solution to Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (FBSDEs),
possibly fully coupled. However, it is not known under which general conditions these
equations have a solution. The FBSDEs theory is presented in the monograph Ma and
Yong (1999). The method of the stochastic maximum principle that we use is covered in the
book Yong and Zhou (1999). For other applications of the stochastic maximum principle in
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finance, see the recent book by Oksendal and Sulem (2004).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we set up the model. In Section 3 we
analyze the tractable case of quadratic cost and separable utility. In Section 4, we find
necessary conditions for the agent’s problem and the principal’s problem in general case. In
Section 5 we discuss how to establish sufficiency and illustrate with the Holmstrom-Milgrom
example. We conclude in Section 6 and provide longer proofs in Appendix.
2 The setting
2.1 Model with symmetric information
We first describe here the model appropriate when considering the full information, first-best
case, in which the agent’s actions are observed.
Let {Wt}t≥0 be a standard Brownian Motion on a probability space (Ω,F , P ) and denote
by FW
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= {FWt }t≤T its augmented filtration on the interval [0, T ]. The controlled state
process, or output process is denoted X = Xu,v and its dynamics are given by
dXt = utvtdt+ vtdWt, X0 = x. (2.1)
Here for simplicity we assume all the processes are one-dimensional. The FW -adapted pro-
cesses u and/or v may be controlled by an agent, who is hired by a principal to control the
output process X.
For example, if u is fixed and v is controlled, process X corresponds exactly to a value
process of a portfolio which invests in a stock and a bank account, whose manager decides
which amount vt of money to hold in the stock at time t, and keeps the rest in the bank
account. The value ut corresponds then to the expected return rate of the stock above the
risk-free rate. This is a well known and standard model in Financial Mathematics. If the
manager can affect the mean return through her effort, for example by carefully choosing
the assets in which to invest, then we can assume that ut is also chosen by the manager.
A more general model would be a standard general model of Stochastic Control Theory
given by
dXt = b(t,Xt, ut, vt)dt+ σ(t,Xt, vt)dWt. (2.2)
When σ is nondegenerate, one can always set
v˜t
4
= σ(t,Xt, vt), u˜t = b(t,Xt, ut, vt)σ
−1(t,Xt, vt).
Then (2.2) becomes (2.1). Moreover, under some monotonicity conditions on b, σ, one can
write u, v as functions of (X, u˜, v˜). In this sense, (2.1) and (2.2) are equivalent. We always
consider models of type (2.1).
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The “full information” case, in which the principal observes X, u, v and thus also W ,
was studied in Cvitanic´, Wan and Zhang (2006). In the so-called “hidden action” case,
the principal can only observe the controlled process Xt, but not the underlying Brownian
motion or the agent’s control u (so the agent’s “action” ut is hidden to the principal). We
present the appropriate model for this, second-best case, in the following section.
At time T , the principal gives the agent compensation in the form of a payoff CT = F (X·),
where F : C[0, T ] → IR is a (deterministic) mapping. We note that since the principal is
assumed to observe the process X continuously, the volatility control v can also be observed
by the principal through the quadratic variation of X, under the assumption v ≥ 0. Because
he can verify what volatility has been used, for a given process v the principal can design
the payoff F in order to induce the agent to implement it (or to “force” her to do so by
harsh penalization). In this sense, we may consider v as a control chosen by the principal
instead of by the agent, as is usual in the literature when action is observed. We say that
the pair (F, v) is a contract.
The agent’s problem is that, given a contract (F, v), she needs to choose the control u
(over some admissible set which will be specified later) in order to maximize her utility
V1(F, v)
4
= sup
u
V1(u;F, v)
4
= sup
u
E[U1 (F (X
u,v
· ), G
u,v
T )].
Here,
Gu,vt
4
=
∫ t
0
g(s,Xs, us, vs)ds (2.3)
is the accumulated cost of the agent, and with a slight abuse of notation we use V1 both for
the objective function and its maximum. We say a contract (F, v) is implementable if there
exists an effort process uF,v which maximizes the agent’s utility given the contract, that is,
it is such that
V1(u
F,v;F, v) = V1(F, v). (2.4)
The principal maximizes her utility
V2
4
= max
F,v,uF,v
E[U2(X
uF,v ,v
T − F (Xu
F,v ,v
· ))], (2.5)
where the maximum is over all implementable contracts (F, v) and corresponding agent’s
optimal efforts uF,v, such that the following participation constraint or individual rationality
(IR) constraint holds:
V1(F, v) ≥ R . (2.6)
Note that typically for a given contract (F, v) the corresponding optimal effort uF,v of
the agent will be unique, in which case the principal only maximizes over (F, v).
Constant R is the reservation utility of the agent and represents the value of the agent’s
outside opportunities, the minimum value she requires to accept the job. Functions U1 and
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U2 are utility functions of the agent and the principal. The typical cases studied in the
literature are the separable utility case with U1(x, y) = U1(x)−y, and the non-separable case
with U1(x, y) = U1(x− y), where, with a slight abuse of notation, we use the same notation
U1 also for the function of one argument only. We could also have the same generality for
U2, but this makes less sense from the economics point of view.
Remark 2.1 A standard way to write the principal’s problem is the one of looking for a so-
called “constrained Pareto optimal” solution, which is such that no other contract satisfying
the required constraints could make both parties better off. More precisely, the problem is
written as
sup
F,v,u
[
E[U2(XT − F )] + λV1(u;F, v)
]
subject to the constraint (2.4). When we restrict ourselves to implementable contracts, then
this formulation is equivalent to our formulation above, because the choice of the “Lagrange
multiplier” λ is equivalent to the choice of the minimal agent’s utility R, while the constraint
(2.4) is absorbed into the principal’s problem by setting the effort u in the principal’s problem
(2.5) equal to uF,v, that is, equal to an effort which the agent will choose optimally given a
contract (F, v). While our formulation is less standard for symmetric information problems,
it is consistent with the approach we will use for solving the problem in the case of hidden
action: we will first characterize the optimal effort of the agent for a given contract, and
then solve the principal’s problem analogous to (2.5).
Remark 2.2 Our approach also works for the framework in which the output process X =
(X1, . . . , Xd), d ≥ 1 is a d−dimensional vector. In this case effort u and Brownian motionW
would also be d−dimensional vectors, while v would be a d×d matrix. The principal’s utility
may take the general form U2(XT , CT ), or a special form U2(
∑
iX
i
T −CT ) as in Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987). By observing X continuously, the principal also observes its quadratic
variation matrix vv∗, where v∗ denotes the transpose of v. Notice that the principal cannot
observe v directly. If we assume further that, given vv∗, the particular choice of v does not
change the value of the cost GT , then the principal essentially “observes” v, and one can
extend all the results in this paper without substantial difficulty.
2.2 Model with hidden action
For the origins, importance and numerous applications of the discrete-time Principal-Agent
theory with hidden action (and more), we refer the reader to the excellent book Bolton and
Dewatripont (2005). The original motivation behind continuous-time models in the seminal
paper Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) was to show that if the agent has a rich strategy
space, then she can undermine complicated contracts, and the principal is forced to use
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simple contracts, as is frequently the case in practice. Before their paper, there was a gap
between the theory, in which complex contracts were optimal, and practice, in which often
relatively simple contracts are observed. They also show that their continuous-time model
in which the drift is controlled, but not the volatility, can be obtained as a limit of a model
in which the outcomes have multinomial distribution, and in which the agent chooses the
probabilities of the outcomes, while the possible outcomes values are fixed. We essentially
adopt Holmstrom and Milgrom continuous-time model for the underlying dynamics, as do
most other existing papers in continuous time.
2.2.1 A single-period model with hidden action
In order to make it easier to understand our continuous-time model, we first present a
simple problem in a single-period model. This is a familiar model, and can be found, for
example, in the book Bolton and Dewatripont (2005). This modeling approach, of the action
determining the distribution of the output, was originally suggested by Mirrlees (1974, 1976)
and extended in Homstrom (1979). It was driven partly by tractability, as Mirrlees (1974,
1976) has shown that without this approach even simple problems may be hard or not have
a solution.
In this model we describe the contract which is optimal among linear contracts, while in
the analogues continuous-time model the same linear contract turns out to be optimal even
if we allow general contracts. This is an advantage of continuous-time, as discovered first in
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987).
The agent picks the distribution of the final output X1 by her action, unobserved by the
principal. We assume that under a fixed probability P = P 0, we have
X1 = X0 + vB1
where v is fixed and B1 is a random variable with a standard normal distribution. By
applying action u, the probability P changes to P u, under which the distribution of B1 is
normal with mean u and variance one. Therefor, under P u, X1 has mean uv.
We consider only contracts which are linear in X1, or, equivalently, in B1:
C1 = k0 + k1B1
We assume a quadratic cost function, g(u) = u2/2, and exponential utility functions. De-
noting by Eu the expectation operator under probability P u, we define the agent’s problem
to be the minimization of
Eu
[
e−γ1(k0+k1B1−u
2/2)
]
= e−γ1(k0−u
2/2+k1u+
1
2
k21γ1)
where we used the fact that
Eu[ekB1 ] = eku+
1
2
k2 (2.7)
8
Hence, the optimal action u is
u = k1 (2.8)
We now describe a method which will also use in the continuous-time case. We suppose
that the principal decides to provide the agent with a contract payoff C1 which results in
(optimal) expected utility of R to the agent. This means that, using (2.7) and (2.8),
R = − 1
γ1
Eu[e−γ1(C1−u
2/2)] = − 1
γ1
e−γ1(k0−
1
2
u2− 1
2
γ1u2) (2.9)
Computing e−γ1k0 from this and using C1 = k0 + uB1, we can write
− 1
γ1
e−γ1C1 = Re−γ1(
1
2
[γ1+1]u2+uB1) (2.10)
Thus, we get a representation of the contract payoff in terms of the agent’s “promised”
utility R and the source of uncertainty B1, something we will find helpful later on, too.
Denoting the principal’s risk aversion with γ2, using e
γ2C1 =
(
e−γ1C1
)−γ2/γ1 , X1 = X0 + vB1
and (2.10), we can write the principal’s expected utility as
Eu[UP (X1 − C1)] = − 1
γ2
(R)−γ2/γ1Eu
[
e−γ2(X0+vB1−
1
2
[γ1+1]u2−uB1)
]
which can be computed as
− 1
γ2
R−γ2/γ1e−γ2(X0−γ2v
2/2+(1+γ2)uv− 12u2(1+γ1+γ2))
Maximizing over u, we get the optimal u as
u = v
1 + γ2
1 + γ1 + γ2
(2.11)
If the principal could choose v, he would optimize the above expression over v, too.
If there was symmetric information, and the model was
X1 = X0 + av + vB1
(under a single, fixed probability P ), in a similar way it can be computed that the optimal
action is u = v, and that the contract is of the form
C1 = c+
γ2
γ1 + γ2
X1
We see that the “sensitivity” γ2
γ1+γ2
of the first-best contract is less than the sensitivity
k1/v =
1+γ2
1+γ1+γ2
of the second-best contract. This is not surprising – when the action is
unobservable the principal is forced to try to induce more effort by offering higher incentives.
As mentioned above, when we illustrate our theory with the Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987)
problem in continuous time, we will see that the above second-best contract is actually
optimal among all contracts, linear or not.
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2.2.2 A continuous-time model with hidden action
Similarly to our single-period model, Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987) assume that the agent is
choosing a probability measure under which the output process evolves (as can be seen in
particular in their proof of Theorem 6 in the appendix of that paper). Schattler and Sung
(1993) make this approach precise and rigorous, based on the so-called weak formulation and
a martingale approach to stochastic control. We adopt the same formulation, and describe
it in more detail next.
Let B be a standard Brownian motion under some probability space with probability
measure Q, and FB = {FBt }0≤t≤T be the filtration on [0, T ] generated by B. For any
FB-adapted square integrable process v > 0, let
Xt
4
= x+
∫ t
0
vsdBs. (2.12)
Then vt is a functional of X, vt = v˜t(X·) and obviously it holds that
FXt = FBt , ∀t.
Moreover, effort process u is assumed to be a functional u˜t of X. Given such u˜, we define
ut
4
= u˜t(X·); But
4
= Bt −
∫ t
0
usds; M
u
t
4
= exp
(∫ t
0
usdBs − 1
2
∫ t
0
|us|2ds
)
; (2.13)
and a new probability measure Qu by
dQu
dQ
4
=MuT .
Then we know by Girsanov Theorem that, under certain conditions, Bu is a Qu-Brownian
motion and
dXt = vtdBt = (u˜tv˜t)(X·)dt+ v˜t(X·)dBut .
That is, in the language of Stochastic Analysis, the triple (X,Bu, P u) is a weak solution to
the SDE
dXt = (u˜tv˜t)(X·)dt+ v˜t(X·)dWt.
Compared to (2.1), we note that in the weak formulation we consider functionals (u˜, v˜) as
controls. Accordingly, we consider (F, v˜) as a contract offered by the principal. The choice of
u˜ corresponds to the choice of probability measure P u, thus to the choice of the distribution
of process X. It is also well known that this is the only way to vary probability measures in
Brownian models, while keeping them equivalent (i.e., having the same null sets).
For any contract payoff CT ∈ FBT , there exists some functional F such that CT = F (X·).
Thus, a contract (F, v˜) is equivalent to a random variable CT ∈ FBT and a process v ∈ FB.
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Also, an action u˜ is equivalent to a process u ∈ FB. For simplicity, in the following we abuse
the notation by writing ut = u˜t(X·) and vt = v˜t(X·) when there is no danger of confusion.
Now given a contract CT ∈ FBT and v ∈ FB, the agent’s problem is to find an optimal
control uCT ,v ∈ FB such that
V1(u
CT ,v;CT , v) = V1(CT , v)
4
= sup
u
V1(u;CT , v),
where, recalling (2.3),
V1(u;CT , v)
4
= EQ
u{U1(CT , GT )} = EQ{MuTU1(CT , GT )}. (2.14)
For simplicity from now on we denote E
4
= EQ and Eu
4
= EQ
u
. The principal’s problem is
to find optimal (C∗T , v
∗) such that
V2(C
∗
T , v
∗) = V2
4
= sup
CT ,v,u
CT ,v
V2(u
CT ,v;CT , v),
where
V2(u;CT , v)
4
= Eu{U2(XT − CT )} = E{MuTU2(XT − CT )}. (2.15)
We see from this last expression that, indeed, the choice of u is really the choice of Mu
and hence the choice of the probability measure, that is, the choice of distribution of the
output X.
As usual in contract theory, we assume that when the agent is indifferent between two
actions, she will choose the one better for the principal.
Remark 2.3 (i) The agent chooses her action based on the output value X which is ob-
servable to the principal. However, although u is FX-adapted, the principal does not know
u˜, and hence does not know the value of Bu either.
(ii) Mathematically, the strong formulation we used in Section 2.1 and the weak formu-
lation of this section are in general not equivalent, due to the different requirements on the
measurability of the agent’s control u. In Section 2.1, u is an FW -adapted process, and thus
FX
u
may be smaller than FW . In contrast, in the weak formulation here, u is FX-adapted,
and thus FB
u
may be smaller than FX .
(iii) If we restrict u to a smaller admissible set, say to those such that FX
u
= FW in
the strong formulation and those such that FX = FB
u
in the weak formulation, then the
two formulations are equivalent. This constraint, however, may make the calculations in the
general framework very difficult.
(iv) However, in the solvable examples existing in the literature, it turns out that, for
the optimal u, the two filtrations are equal (e.g., the solution u in the strong formulation is
a feedback control, or even deterministic); see below for more comments.
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(iv) In the strong formulation, one has to distinguish the optimal contract F and its
realized optimal value CT = F (X.) (see, e.g. Cvitanic´, Wan and Zhang (2006)). In the weak
formulation, since, given the outcome ω ∈ Ω, the output value of X is fixed (independent of
u), the random variable CT can be understood as the contract, and we do so in this paper.
We note that often in the literature, for tractability reasons the weak formulation is used
for the agent’s problem and the strong formulation for the principal’s problem. However,
there is a subtle measurability issue, as pointed out in part (ii) of the above remark, More
precisely, on one hand, the optimal action uF,v obtained from the agent’s problem by using
the weak formulation may not be in the admissible set under the strong formulation (if
FB
u
is strictly smaller than FX); on the other hand, given a principal’s target action u (see
§4.2.2) in the strong formulation, it is not always possible to obtain it as an optimal solution
of the agent’s problem in the weak formulation, as it may not be even implementable. In
this paper we are able to develop a general theory using the weak formulation for both
the agent’s problem and the principal’s problem, avoiding potential inconsistencies. On the
other hand, as mentioned in part (iv) of the above remark, in all the solvable examples in the
literature it turns out that the optimal, for the strong formulation, effort u is a functional
of output X only (and not of Brownian Motion W ). If that is the case, one may use the
strong formulation for the principal’s problem without loss of generality.
We now present a special case which can be solved more or less straightforwardly, and
it is probably the most interesting part of the paper for economic applications. Later, we
present a more fully developed mathematical theory, which, unfortunately does not lead
to general existence results, or additional solvable examples, but it does provide necessary
conditions for optimality.
3 Special case: Separable utility with fixed volatility v
and quadratic cost g
The model we present here is quite general in the choice of the utility functions, and thus
could be of use in many economic applications. The solution is explicit in the characterization
of the optimal contract payoff CT , via a nonlinear deterministic equation. It is in general
semi-explicit in terms of the optimal effort u, as it boils down to solving a linear BSDE (not
FBSDE!). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first explicit description of a solution to a
continuous-time Principal-Agent problem with hidden action and lump-sum payment, other
than the case of exponential and linear utility functions. Moreover, as in those two cases,
the optimal contract is still a function only of the final outcome XT , and not of the history
of the output process X, but unlike those two cases, the dependence on XT is nonlinear in
general.
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We assume the process v is fixed; the agent takes separable utility U1(CT )−GT ; and the
cost function is
g(t, x, u, v) = u2/2.
First we adopt standard assumptions for utility functions, which are assumed throughout
this section.
Assumption 3.1 U1, U2 are twice differentiable such that U
′
i > 0, U
′′
i ≤ 0, i = 1, 2.
We now specify the technical conditions u and CT should satisfy. Roughly speaking, we
need enough integrability so that calculations in the remaining of the section can go through.
Definition 3.1 The set A1 of admissible effort processes u is the space of FB-adapted
processes u such that
(i) P (
∫ T
0
|ut|2dt <∞) = 1;
(ii) E{|MuT |4} <∞.
We note that any u ∈ A1 satisfies the Novikov condition and thus the Girsanov Theorem
can be applied, see (7.1) at below.
Definition 3.2 The set A2 of admissible contracts is the space of FBT -measurable CT such
that
(i) E{|U1(CT )|4 + e4U1(CT )} <∞.
(ii) E
{
|U2(XT − CT )|2 + eU1(CT )|U2(XT − CT )|
}
<∞.
3.1 Agent’s problem
First we establish a simple technical lemma for a linear BSDE.
Lemma 3.1 Assume u ∈ FB, Girsanov Theorem holds true for (Bu, Qu), and E{|MuT |2} <
∞. Then for any ξ ∈ FBT such that Eu{|ξ|2} <∞, there exists a unique Qu-square integrable
pair (Y, Z) ∈ FB such that
Yt = ξ −
∫ T
t
ZsdB
u
s . (3.1)
Obviously Yt = E
u
t {ξ}, and uniqueness also follows immediately. But in general FBu 6=
FB, so we cannot apply the standard Martingale Representation Theorem directly to obtain
Z. Nevertheless, the result follows from an extended Martingale Representation Theorem,
see Fujisaki, Kallianpur and Kunita (1972), and for completeness we provide a proof in
Appendix. We now solve the agent’s problem.
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Theorem 3.1 For any contract CT ∈ A2, the optimal effort uˆ ∈ A1 for the agent is obtained
by solving the BSDE
Y¯t = Et[e
U1(CT )] = eU1(CT ) −
∫ T
t
uˆsY¯sdBs (3.2)
Moreover, the agent’s optimal expected utility is given by
V1 = log Y¯0 = logE[e
U1(CT )]. (3.3)
Remark 3.1 (i) We can see from the proof below that
log Y¯t = U1(CT )− 1
2
∫ T
t
uˆ2sds−
∫ T
t
uˆsdB
uˆ
s (3.4)
represents the remaining expected utility of the agent when she behaves optimally. Thus, the
optimal uˆ is chosen so that the remaining expected utility is increasing by the reduction in
the remaining cost until it reaches U1(CT ), and there is additional mean zero term
∫ T
t
uˆsdB
uˆ
s .
Actually, the fact that the integrand of this term is equal to uˆ distinguishes the optimal effort
from non-optimal efforts.
(ii) One of the main insights of Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987) and Schattler and Sung
(1993) is the representation of the optimal payoff CT in terms of the agent’s optimal effort
uˆ and her utility certainty equivalent. That representation corresponds in our model of this
section to equation (3.4), after a transformation (the certainty equivalent is U−11 (log Y¯t)).
For our case of separable utilities it is more convenient to work with the remaining utility
as in (3.4) than with the certainty equivalent.
(iii) In the language of option pricing theory finding uˆ is equivalent to finding a replicating
portfolio for the option with payoff eU1(CT ). Numerous methods have been developed to
compute such an object, sometimes analytically, otherwise numerically. Let us comment on
this in more detail. As we will see below, the optimal contract (when exists) is going to be
a deterministic function of XT , say CT = c(XT ). Assume vt = v(t,Xt) is a deterministic
function of X and t and thus X is Markovian. Then the solution to the BSDE (3.2) is a
function of Xt, that is, Y¯t = F (t,Xt) and
dF (t,Xt) = [Ft +
1
2
Fxxv
2
t ]dt+ FxvtdBt.
Since Y¯ is a martingale, the dt term has to be zero, so that F satisfies the PDE{
Ft(t, x) +
1
2
v2(t, x)Fxx(t, x) = 0;
F (T, x) = eU1(c(x));
(3.5)
and
ut = u(t,Xt) =
v(t,Xt)Fx(t,Xt)
F (t,Xt)
. (3.6)
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Proof of the theorem: We first claim that the BSDE (3.2) is well-posed and that uˆ
determined by (3.2) is indeed in A1. The proof is technical and thus is postponed to the
Appendix.
We now show that uˆ is optimal for the agent’s problem. For any u ∈ A1, as is standard
in this type of stochastic control problems (see Schattler and Sung 1993, for example) and,
in particular, in dynamic principal-agent problems, we consider the remaining utility of the
agent at time t
WA,ut = E
u
t
[
U1(CT )− 1
2
∫ T
t
u2sds
]
.
Then WA,ut − 12
∫ t
0
u2sds is a Q
u-martingale, so by Lemma 3.1 there exists an FB-adapted
process ZA,u such that
WA,ut −
1
2
∫ t
0
u2sds = U1(CT )−
1
2
∫ T
0
u2sds−
∫ T
t
ZA,us dB
u
s .
Then, switching from Bu to B, we have
WA,ut = U1(CT ) +
∫ T
t
[usZ
A,u
s −
1
2
u2s]ds−
∫ T
t
ZA,us dBs. (3.7)
Note that WA,u0 = E
u[U1(CT ) − 12
∫ T
0
u2sds], is the agent’s utility, given action u. On the
other hand, for uˆ from the theorem, using Itoˆ’s rule and (3.2), we get
log Y¯t = U1(CT ) +
1
2
∫ T
t
uˆ2sds−
∫ T
t
uˆsdBs.
Thus, log Y¯0 = E[log Y¯0] = W
A,uˆ
0 is the agent’s utility if she chooses action uˆ. Notice that
WA,uˆ0 −WA,u0 =
∫ T
0
[1
2
[|uˆt|2 + |ut|2]− utZA,ut
]
dt+
∫ T
0
[ZA,ut − uˆt]dBt
≥
∫ T
0
[
uˆtut − utZA,ut
]
dt+
∫ T
0
[ZA,ut − uˆt]dBt
=
∫ T
0
[ZA,ut − uˆt]dBut . (3.8)
The equality holds if and only if u = uˆ. Note that Eu{∫ T
0
|ZA,ut |2dt} <∞, and
Eu
{∫ T
0
|uˆt|2dt
}
= E
{
MuT
∫ T
0
|uˆt|2dt
}
≤ CE
{
|MuT |2 + (
∫ T
0
|uˆt|2dt)2
}
<∞,
thanks to (7.1) at below. Then
Eu
{∫ T
0
[ZA,ut − uˆt]2dt
}
<∞.
Taking expected values under Qu in (3.8) we get WA,uˆ0 ≥ WA,u0 , with equality if and only if
u = uˆ.
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3.2 Principal’s problem
Since, given a contract CT ∈ A2, the agent’s optimal effort uˆ = uˆ(CT ) from Theorem 3.1 is
unique, the principal’s optimization problem can be written as
sup
CT
Euˆ(CT )[U2(XT − CT )] (3.9)
under the constraint (2.6).
Note now that by solving the linear equation (3.2), we get, denoting henceforth uˆ = u,
Y¯t = Y¯0e
∫ t
0 usdBs− 12
∫ t
0 u
2
sds
which, together with (2.13) and (3.3), gives the following crucial fact
U1(CT ) = log Y¯T = V1 + log(M
u
T ) (3.10)
This turns out to be exactly the reason why this problem is tractable: the fact that for the
optimal agent’s effort u, we have
MuT = e
−V1eU1(CT ) (3.11)
In other words, the choice of the probability measure corresponding to the optimal action u
has an explicit functional relation with the promised payoff CT .
When we use this expression, and recall that Eu[X] = E[MuTX], we can rewrite the
principal’s problem as
sup
CT ,V1
e−V1E
{
eU1(CT )[U2 (XT − CT ) + λ]
}
, (3.12)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier for the IR constraint E[eU1(CT )] = eV1 (see (3.3)).
As usual in hidden action problems, we see that the principal will give the smallest
possible utility to the agent,
V1 = R.
Moreover, we get
Proposition 3.1 Assume that the contract CT is required to satisfy
L ≤ CT ≤ H
for some FT−measurable random variables L,H, which may take infinite values. If, with
probability one, there exists a finite value CˆλT (ω) ∈ [L(ω), H(ω)] that maximizes
eU1(CT )[U2 (XT − CT ) + λ] (3.13)
and λ can be found so that
E[eU1(Cˆ
λ
T )] = eR
then CˆλT is the optimal contract.
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Since (3.13) is considered ω by ω, we reduce the problem to a one-variable deterministic
optimization problem.
Remark 3.2 In this remark we assume that there is an interior solution when maximizing
(3.13).
(i) The first order condition for maximizing (3.13) can be written as
U ′2(XT − CT )
U ′1(CT )
= λ+ U2(XT − CT ). (3.14)
This is a generalization of the classical Borch rule for risk-sharing in the first-best (full
information) case:
U ′2(XT − CT )
U ′1(CT )
= λ. (3.15)
The difference is the last term in (3.14): the ratio of marginal utilities of the agent and
the principal is no longer constant, but a constant plus utility of the principal. Increase in
global utility of the principal also makes him happier at the margin, relative to the agent,
and decrease in global utility makes him less happy at the margin. This will tend to make the
contract “more nonlinear” than in the first-best case. For example, if both utility functions
are exponential, and we require CT ≥ L > −∞ (for technical reasons), it is easy to check
from (3.15) that the first-best contract CT will be linear in XT for CT > L. On the other
hand, as can be seen from (3.14), the second-best contract will be nonlinear.
(ii) Note that the optimal contract is a function of the final value XT only. In the
previous continuous-time literature, only the cases of exponential (non-separable) utility
functions and linear utility functions have been solved explicitly, leading to linear contracts.
It’s been stated that in the case of general utilities the optimal contract may depend on
the history of the process X. However, this is not the case in the special framework of this
section.
(iii) The first order condition can be solved for the optimal contract CT = CT (XT ) as a
function of XT , and we can find, omitting the functions arguments, that
∂
∂XT
CT = 1− U
′
2U
′′
1
U ′′2U
′
1 + U
′
2U
′′
1 − U ′2(U ′1)2
.
Thus, the contract is a non-decreasing function of XT , and its slope with respect to XT is
not higher than one.
In the first-best case of (3.15), we have
∂
∂XT
CT = 1− U
′
2U
′′
1
U ′′2U
′
1 + U
′
2U
′′
1
.
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We see that the sensitivity of the contract is higher in the second-best case, because more
incentives are needed to induce the agent to provide optimal effort when the effort is hidden.
The term which causes the increase in the slope of the contract is U ′2(U
′
1)
2 in the denominator.
We see that this term is dominated by the agent’s marginal utility, but it also depends on
the principal’s marginal utility. Higher marginal utility for either party causes the slope of
the contract to increase relative to the first-best case.
There is also an alternative way to formulate the principal’s problem, as optimizing over
effort u, or probability measures Qu, which we present next. From (3.10), with V1 = R, the
principal’s problem is
sup
u
E[G(MuT )]
4
= sup
u
E [MuTU2 (XT − J1 (R + log(MuT )))] .
Here, J1
4
= U−11 and G is a random function on positive real numbers, defined by
G(x)
4
= xU2(XT − J1(R + log(x)).
It is straightforward to compute that
G′′(x) < 0
so that G is a strictly concave function, for every fixed XT (ω).
We define the dual function, for y > 0,
G˜(y) = max
x≥0
[G(x)− xy].
The maximum is attained at
xˆ = [(G′)−1(y)]+.
Thus, we get the following upper bound on the principal’s problem, for any constant λ > 0:
E[G(MuT )] ≤ E[G˜(λ)] + λE[MuT ] = E[G˜(λ)] + λ.
The upper bound will be attained if
MuT = (G
′)−1(λ)
and λ is chosen such that
E[(G′)−1(λ)] = 1.
This leads to the following alternative to the Proposition 3.1
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Proposition 3.2 Assume (for simplicity) that there are no required bounds on the contract
CT . If, with probability one, (G
′)−1(λ) > 0 for λ for which E[(G′)−1(λ)] = 1, then the
optimal effort u satisfies the Backward SDE
Mut = (G
′)−1(λ)−
∫ T
t
usM
u
s dBs
(assuming a solution exists). Moreover, we have
(G′)−1(λ) = e−ReΦ(XT ,λ)
where CT = Φ(XT , λ) is a solution to (3.14), and it is the optimal payoff.
Proof: By the above upper bound, MuT = (G
′)−1(λ) is optimal for the principal’s prob-
lem, and the BSDE from the proposition is the consequence of the dynamics of the process
Mt. Moreover, we have
G′(e−ReΦ(XT ,λ)) = U2(XT − J1(Φ(XT , λ))− U ′2(XT − J1(Φ(XT , λ)))J ′1(Φ(XT , λ)) = λ
where the last equality comes from the definition of Φ(XT , c). Thus the BSDE for u becomes
Mut = e
−ReΦ(XT ,cˆ) −
∫ T
t
usM
u
s dBs
where, since E[MuT ] = 1, we have
E[eΦ(XT ,λ)] = eR,
so that the IR constraint is satisfied.
3.3 Examples
Example 3.1 Suppose the principal is risk-neutral while the agent is risk averse with
U2(x) = x , U1(x) = log x
Also assume σt > 0 is a given process and
vt = σtXt , X0 = x > 0
so that Xt > 0 for all t. Moreover, assume that
λ˜
4
= 2eR − x > 0
The first order condition (3.14) gives
CT =
1
2
(XT + λ)
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and in order to satisfy the IR constraint
eR = E[CT ] =
1
2
(x+ λ)
we need to take λ = λ˜. By the assumptions, we have CT > 0, and CT is then the optimal
contract and it is linear. The optimal u is obtained by solving BSDE
Y¯t = Et[CT ] = e
R +
∫ t
0
Y¯tutdBt
Noting that
Et[CT ] =
1
2
(Xt + λ) = e
R +
∫ t
0
σtXtdBt
we get
ut = 2σt
Xt
Xt + λ
Since λ > 0, we see that the effort goes down as the output decreases, and goes up when
the output goes up. Thus, the incentive effect coming from the fact that the agent is paid
an increasing function of the output at the end, translates into earlier times, so when the
promise of the future payment gets higher, the agent works harder. Also notice that the
effort is bounded in this example (by 2σt).
Assume now that σ is deterministic. The principal’s expected utility can be computed
to be equal to
Eu[XT − CT ] = e−RE[CT (XT − CT )] = x− eR + e−Rx
2
4
[e
∫ T
0 σ
2
sds − 1]
The first term, x − eR, is what the principal can get if he pays a constant payoff CT , in
which case the agent would choose u ≡ 0. The second term is the extra benefit of inducing
the agent to apply non-zero effort. The extra benefit increases quadratically with the initial
output, increases exponentially with the volatility squared, and decreases exponentially with
the agent’s reservation utility. While the principal would like best to have the agent with
the lowest R, the cost of hiring expensive agents is somewhat offset when the volatility is
high (which is not surprising, given that the principal is risk-neutral).
For comparison, we look now at the first-best case in this example. Interestingly, we
have
Remark 3.3 Assume that σt > 0 is deterministic and bounded. Then the principal’s first-
best optimal utility is ∞.
Proof. We see from (3.15) that, whenever the principal is risk-neutral, a candidate for
an optimal contract is a constant contract CT . With log-utility for the agent, we set
CT = λ
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where λ is obtained from the IR constraint, and the optimal utility of the principal is
obtained from
sup
u
E[XT − λ] = sup
u
[
E
{
xe
∫ T
0 [utσt− 12σ2t ]dt+
∫ T
0 σtdBt
}
− eReE{
∫ T
0
1
2
u2tdt}
]
. (3.16)
Under the assumption that σ is deterministic and bounded, we show now that the right
side of (3.16) is ∞. In fact, for any n, set
An
4
= {
∫ T
2
0
σtdBt > n} ∈ FT
2
; αn
4
= P (An)→ 0;
and
unt (ω)
4
=
{
α
− 1
2
n , T2 ≤ t ≤ T, ω ∈ An;
0, otherwise.
(3.17)
Then the cost is finite:
E
{∫ T
0
1
2
(unt )
2dt
}
=
T
4
.
However, for a generic constant c > 0,
E
{
x exp
(∫ T
0
[unt σt −
1
2
σ2t ]dt+
∫ T
0
σtdBt
)}
= E
{
x exp
(
α
− 1
2
n
∫ T
T
2
σtdt1An −
∫ T
0
1
2
σ2t dt+
∫ T
0
σtdBt
)}
≥ E
{
x exp
(
α
− 1
2
n
∫ T
T
2
σtdt−
∫ T
0
1
2
σ2t dt+
∫ T
0
σtdBt
)
1An
}
= E
{
x exp
(
α
− 1
2
n
∫ T
T
2
σtdt−
∫ T
2
0
1
2
σ2t dt+
∫ T
2
0
σtdBt
)
1An
}
≥ cE
{
x exp
(
α
− 1
2
n
∫ T
T
2
σtdt+ n
)
1An
}
= cx exp
(
α
− 1
2
n
∫ T
T
2
σtdt+ n
)
P (An)
= cx exp
(
α
− 1
2
n
∫ T
T
2
σtdt+ n
)
αn ≥ cxαnecα
− 12
n ,
which obviously diverges to ∞ as αn → 0.
We note that another completely solvable example in this special framework is the case
of both the principal and the agent having linear utilities. But in that case it is easily shown
that the first-best and the second-best are the same, so there is no need to consider the
second-best.
The property that ut is increasing in the output values Xt holds true in more general
cases. We have the following result whose proof is postponed to the Appendix.
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Proposition 3.3 Suppose that U2(x) = x and vt = σtXt for deterministic σt ≥ 0. Assume
λ is non-negative and (3.13) admits an interior solution. Assume further that
max(H1(x), H2(x)) ≥ 0, (3.18)
for any x in the domain of U1, where
H1
4
= U ′1U
′′′
1 + (U
′
1)
2U ′′1 − 3(U ′′1 )2; H2 4= (U ′1)4 + U ′1U
′′′
1 − (U ′1)2U ′′1 − 2(U ′′1 )2 + xU ′1H1.
Then ut = u(t,Xt) for some deterministic function u and ux ≥ 0.
Remark 3.4 The following examples satisfy the condition (3.18).
(i) U1(x) = x. Then
U ′1 = 1, U
′′
1 = U
′′′
1 = 0.
Thus
H1(x) = 0.
(ii) U1(x) = log(x). Then
U ′1 = x
−1, U ′′1 = −x−2, U
′′′
1 = 2x
−3.
Thus
H2(x) = 0.
(iii) U1(x) =
1
γ
xγ where 0 < γ < 1. Then
U ′1 = x
γ−1, U ′′1 = (γ − 1)xγ−2, U
′′′
1 = (γ − 1)(γ − 2)xγ−3.
Thus
H2(x) = γx
2γ−4
[
x2γ + 2(1− γ)xγ + (1− γ)
]
≥ 0.
Exponential utility U1(x) = − 1γ e−γx does not satisfy (3.18).
4 General case: Necessary conditions
In the rest of the paper we find necessary conditions, and discuss a possibility of finding
sufficient conditions for optimal contracts in a very general framework. This material is
technical, and much less intuitive than the special case discussed in the previous section.
We use the method of the so-called Stochastic Maximum Principle, as described in the
book Yong and Zhou (1999). It is an extension of the Pontryagin maximum principle to
the stochastic case. We believe this is the right method to use for the general theory. For
example, it naturally leads to the use of remaining expected utility of the agent as the variable
on which the solution heavily depends, and also it shows immediately what other variables
are important, without having to guess what they should be, as in other approaches.
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4.1 Standing assumptions
Recall the setup from Section 2. We need the following assumptions.
(A1.) Function g : [0, T ] × IR× IR× IR×Ω → IR is continuously differentiable with
respect to x, u, v, gx is uniformly bounded, and gu, gv have uniform linear growth in x, u, v.
In addition, g is jointly convex in (x, u, v), gu > 0 and guu > 0.
(A2.) (i) Functions U1 : IR
2 → IR, U2 : IR→ IR are differentiable, with ∂1U1 > 0, ∂2U1 <
0, U ′2 > 0, U1 is jointly concave and U2 is concave.
(ii) Sometimes we will also need U1 ≤ K for some constant K.
For any p ≥ 1, denote
LpT (Q
u)
4
= {ξ ∈ FBT : Eu{|ξ|p} <∞}; Lp(Qu) 4= {η ∈ FB : Eu{
∫ T
0
|ηt|pdt} <∞},
and define LpT (Q), L
p(Q) in a similar way.
We next define the admissible set for the agent’s controls.
(A3.) Given a contract (CT , v), the admissible set A(CT , v) of agent’s controls associated
with this contract is the set of all those u ∈ FB such that
(i) Girsanov Theorem holds true for (Bu, Qu);
(ii) U1(CT , GT ), ∂2U1(CT , GT ) ∈ L2T (Qu);
(iii) For any bounded ∆u ∈ FB, there exists ε0 > 0 such that for any ε ∈ [0, ε0), uε
satisfies (i) and (ii) at above and |uε|4, |gε|4, |gεu|4, |M εT |4, U21 (CT , GεT ), |∂2U1(CT , GεT )|2 are
uniformly integrable in L1(Q) or L1T (Q), where
uε
4
= u+ ε∆u, GεT
4
=
∫ T
0
gε(t)dt, M εt
4
=Mu
ε
t , V
ε
1
4
= V1(u
ε),
and
gε(t)
4
= g(t,Xt, u
ε
t , vt), g
ε
u(t)
4
= gu(t,Xt, u
ε
t , vt).
When ε = 0 we omit the superscript “0”. We note that, for any u ∈ A(CT , v) and ∆u, ε0
satisfying (A3) (iii), we have uε ∈ A(CT , v) for any ε ∈ [0, ε0). We note also that, under
mild assumptions on (CT , v), all bounded u belong to A(CT , v).
The admissible set for the contracts (CT , v) is more involved. We postpone its description
until later.
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4.2 Necessary Conditions
4.2.1 The Agent’s problem
We fix now a contract (CT , v), u ∈ A(CT , v), and ∆u ∈ FB bounded. Denote, omitting
arguments of U1, ∂2U1, the “variations”
∇g(t) 4= gu(t,Xt, ut, vt)∆ut;
∇Gt 4=
∫ t
0
∇g(s)ds;
∇Mt 4=Mt[
∫ t
0
∆usdBs −
∫ t
0
us∆usds] =Mt
∫ t
0
∆usdB
u
s ;
∇V1 4= E
{
∇MTU1 +MT∂2U1∇GT
}
.
Moreover, for any bounded ∆u ∈ FB and ε ∈ (0, ε0) as in (A3)(iii), denote
∇gε(t) 4= g
ε(t)− g(t)
ε
; ∇GεT 4=
GεT −GT
ε
; ∇M εT 4=
M εT −MT
ε
; ∇V ε1 4=
V ε1 − V1
ε
.
For a given payoff CT and cost variable GT , introduce the so-called adjoint processes
WAt = E
u
t [U1(CT , GT )] = U1(CT , GT )−
∫ T
t
ZA,1s dB
u
s ;
Y At = E
u
t [∂2U1(CT , GT )] = ∂2U1(CT , GT )−
∫ T
t
ZA,2s dB
u
s
(4.1)
where ZA,i are obtained from Lemma 3.1. The first one represents the agent’s remaining
expected utility, and the second one the agent’s remaining expected marginal cost. The
latter becomes unimportant when the utility is separable (when U1(C,G) = U1(C)−G then
Y At ≡ −1).
Theorem 4.1 Under our standing assumptions, we have the following differentiation result
for the value function of the agent:
lim
²→0
∇V ε1 = ∇V1 = Eu
{∫ T
0
ΓAt ∆utdt
}
(4.2)
where
ΓAt
4
= ZA,1t + gu(t,Xt, ut, vt)Y
A
t . (4.3)
In particular, the necessary condition for u to be an optimal control is:
ZA,1t + gu(t,Xt, ut, vt)Y
A
t ≡ 0. (4.4)
Proof: See Appendix.
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Remark 4.1 In the separable case the necessary condition becomes gu = Z
A,1 (since Y At ≡
−1). We can interpret ZA,1 as a “derivative” of the agent’s remaining utility with respect to
the Brownian motion (actually, it is equal to what is called a Malliavin derivative). Thus,
at the optimum, in the separable utility case the agent’s local marginal cost of effort has to
be equal to the sensitivity of the agent’s remaining utility with respect to the underlying
uncertainty. In the non-separable case, this has to be adjusted by normalizing with the
global marginal cost Y At .
We now provide a FBSDE characterization of the necessary condition. We see that given
(CT , v) (and thus also X), the optimal u should satisfy the FBSDE
Gt =
∫ t
0
g(s,Xs, us, vs)ds;
WAt = U1(CT , GT )−
∫ T
t
ZA,1s dB
u
s ;
Y At = ∂2U1(CT , GT )−
∫ T
t
ZA,2s dB
u
s ;
(4.5)
with maximum condition (4.4).
Moreover, since guu > 0, we may assume there exists a function h(t, x, v, z) such that
gu(t, x, h(t, x, v, z), v) = z. (4.6)
Note that ∂2U1 < 0, so Y
A
t < 0. Thus, (4.4) is equivalent to
ut = h(t,Xt, vt,−ZA,1t /Y At ). (4.7)
That is, given (CT , v) and X, one may solve the following (self-contained) FBSDE:
Gt =
∫ t
0
g(s,Xs, h(s,Xs, vs,−ZA,1s /Y As ), vs)ds;
WAt = U1(CT , GT ) +
∫ T
t
ZA,1s h(s,Xs, vs,−ZA,1s /Y As )ds−
∫ T
t
ZA,1s dBs;
Y At = ∂2U1(CT , GT ) +
∫ T
t
ZA,2s h(s,Xs, vs,−ZA,1s /Y As )ds−
∫ T
t
ZA,2s dBs.
(4.8)
Then, as a necessary condition, the optimal control uCT ,v should be defined by (4.7).
4.2.2 The Principal’s problem
We now characterize the admissible set A of contracts (CT , v). Our first requirement is:
(A4.) (CT , v) is implementable. That is, (4.8) has a unique solution, and u
CT ,v defined
by (4.7) is in A(CT , v).
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Note that we found only necessary conditions for the agent. Later we will have some
discussion on when the above uCT ,v is indeed the agent’s optimal control. Thus, solving
the principal’s problem with uCT ,v instead of general u is not quite satisfying the constraint
(2.4), but it represents solving a “relaxed” problem over efforts which satisfy the agent’s
necessary condition of optimality. This is traditionally called “the first-order approach”.
The approach will produce the optimal solution if the necessary conditions for the agent are
also sufficient.
Now, an implementable contract (CT , v) uniquely determines u
CT ,v. In fact, for fixed v,
the correspondence between CT and u
CT ,v is one to one, up to a constant. To see this, we
fix some (u, v) and want to find some CT such that u
CT ,v = u. For notational convenience,
we denote
ZA
4
= ZA,2.
If u = uCT ,v for some CT , then (4.4) holds true for u. That is,
ZA,1t = −gu(t,Xt, ut, vt)Y At .
Denote by R˜ the agent’s expected utility, that is R˜
4
= WA0 . Then (4.5) becomes
Gt =
∫ t
0
g(s,Xs, us, vs)ds;
WAt = R˜−
∫ t
0
gu(s,Xs, us, vs)Y
A
s dB
u
s ;
Y At = ∂2U1(CT , GT )−
∫ T
t
ZAs dB
u
s ;
(4.9)
where
WAT = U1(CT , GT ). (4.10)
Since ∂1U1 > 0, we may assume there exists a function H(x, y) such that
U1(H(x, y), y) = x. (4.11)
Then (4.10) leads to
CT
4
= H(WAT , GT ), (4.12)
Plugging this into (4.9), we get
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
vsdBs;
Gt =
∫ t
0
g(s,Xs, us, vs)ds;
WAt = R˜−
∫ t
0
gu(s,Xs, us, vs)Y
A
s dB
u
s ;
Y At = ∂2U1(H(W
A
T , GT ), GT )−
∫ T
t
ZAs dB
u
s ;
(4.13)
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Now fix (R˜, u, v). If FBSDE (4.13) is well-posed, we may define CT by (4.12) and we can
easily see that uCT ,v = u. In this sense, for technical convenience, from now on we consider
(R˜, u, v) (instead of (CT , v)) as a contract, or say, as the principal’s control, and we call u
the principal’s target action. Then (A4) should be rewritten as
(A4’.) We assume that (R˜, u, v) is an implementable contract, by which we mean:
(i) FBSDE (4.13) is well-posed;
(ii) For CT defined by (4.12), (CT , v) is implementable in the sense of (A4).
We note that the theory of FBSDEs is far from complete. The well-posedness of (4.13) is
in general unclear (unless we put strict conditions), In fact, even for linear FBSDEs there is
no general result like Lemma 3.1. Instead of adopting too strong technical conditions, in this
paper we assume the well-posedness of the involved FBSDEs directly and leave the general
FBSDE theory for future research. However, in the separable utility case, the corresponding
FBSDEs will become decoupled FBSDEs and thus we can use Lemma 3.1 to establish their
well-posedness, as we will see later.
Now for any (u, v) and any bounded (∆u,∆v), denote
uεt
4
= ut + ε∆ut; v
ε
t
4
= vt + ε∆vt;
Xεt
4
= x+
∫ t
0
vεsdBs; G
ε
T
4
=
∫ T
0
g(t,Xεt , u
ε
t , v
ε
t )dt; (4.14)
∇Xε 4= X
ε −X
ε
; ∇GεT 4=
GεT −GT
ε
; ∇V ε2 4=
V ε2 − V2
ε
.
Denote also with superscript ε all corresponding quantities.
(A5.) The principal’s admissible set A of controls is the set of all those contracts (R˜, u, v)
such that, for any bounded (∆u,∆v), there exists a constant ε1 > 0 such that for for any
ε ∈ [0, ε1):
(i) (A4’) holds true for (R˜, uε, vε);
(ii) The FBSDEs (4.17) and (4.19) below are well-posed for (R˜, uε, vε);
(iii) lim
ε→0
∇V ε2 = ∇Y P0 for ∇Y P0 defined in (4.17) below.
Note again that we will specify sufficient conditions for (A5) in the separable utility case
later on. We also assume that A is not empty.
We now derive the necessary conditions for the Principal’s problem. Since
R˜ = Eu{WAT } = Eu{U1(CT , GT )}
is the optimal utility of the agent, the condition (2.6) becomes equivalent to
R˜ ≥ R.
Intuitively it is obvious that the principal would choose R˜ = R in order to maximize her
utility. Again, due to the lack of satisfactory theory of FBSDEs, here we simply assume that
27
the optimal R˜ = R, and we will prove it rigorously in the separable utility case by using the
comparison theorem of BSDEs, as we did in the special case.
Given (u, v), let (X,G,WA, Y A, ZA) be the solution to (4.13) with R˜ = R. Define CT by
(4.12). This will guarantee that the agent’s necessary condition is satisfied. Introduce the
principal’s remaining expected utility
Y Pt = E
u
t [U2(XT − CT )] = U2(XT − CT )−
∫ T
t
ZPs dB
u
s ; (4.15)
By Lemma 3.1 (4.15) is well-posed. Then the principal’s problem is to choose optimal (u, v)
in order to maximize
V2(u, v)
4
= Eu{Y PT } = Y P0 . (4.16)
Similarly as before, denote, omitting functions’ arguments,
∇Xt =
∫ t
0
∆vsdBs;
∇gu = guu∆u+ guv∆v + gux∇X
∇GT =
∫ T
0
[gx∇Xt + gu∆ut + gv∆vt]dt.
Moreover, consider the following FBSDE system
∇WAt =
∫ t
0
guY
A
s ∆usds−
∫ t
0
[gu∇Y As + Y As ∇gu]dBus ;
∇Y At = ∂12U1∇CT + ∂22U1∇GT +
∫ T
t
ZAs ∆usds−
∫ T
t
∇ZAs dBus ;
∇Y Pt = U ′2[∇XT −∇CT ] +
∫ T
t
ZPs ∆usds−
∫ T
t
∇ZPs dBus .
(4.17)
where ∇CT is defined by
∇WAT = ∂1U1∇CT + ∂2U1∇GT ; (4.18)
For the general framework we have here, we need to introduce the following “adjoint pro-
cesses” Xi, Yi, Zi, which, unfortunately, do not all have a direct economic intuition:
X1t =
∫ t
0
guZ
1
sds;
X2t =
∫ t
0
[guxZ
1
sY
A
s + gxY
2
s ]ds;
Y 1t =
1
∂1U1
[U ′2 −X1T∂12U1]−
∫ T
t
Z1sdB
u
s ;
Y 2t =
∂2U1
∂1U1
[U ′2 −X1T∂12U1] +X1T∂22U1 −
∫ T
t
Z2sdB
u
s ;
Y 3t = X
2
T + U
′
2 −
∫ T
t
Z3sdB
u
s .
(4.19)
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Theorem 4.2 Under (A5), we have
∇Y P0 = Eu
{∫ T
0
ΓP,1t ∆utdt+
∫ T
0
ΓP,2t ∆vtdt
}
, (4.20)
where {
ΓP,1t
4
= ZPt − guY 1t Y At +X1t ZAt + guuZ1t Y At + guY 2t ;
ΓP,2t
4
= guvZ
1
t Y
A
t + gvY
2
t + Z
3
t + ut(Y
3
t −X2t ).
(4.21)
In particular, the necessary condition for (u, v) to be an optimal control is:
ΓP,1t = Γ
P,2
t = 0. (4.22)
Proof. See Appendix.
In summary, we have the following system of necessary conditions for the principal:
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
vsdBs;
Gt =
∫ t
0
g(s,Xs, us, vs)ds;
WAt = R−
∫ t
0
guY
A
s dB
u
s ;
X1t =
∫ t
0
guZ
1
sds;
X2t =
∫ t
0
[guxZ
1
sY
A
s + gxY
2
s ]ds;
Y At = ∂2U1(H(W
A
T , GT ), GT )−
∫ T
t
ZAs dB
u
s ;
Y Pt = U2(XT −H(WAT , GT ))−
∫ T
t
ZPs dB
u
s ;
Y 1t =
1
∂1U1
[U ′2 −X1T∂12U1]−
∫ T
t
Z1sdB
u
s ;
Y 2t =
∂2U1
∂1U1
[U ′2 −X1T∂12U1] +X1T∂22U1 −
∫ T
t
Z2sdB
u
s ;
Y 3t = X
2
T + U
′
2 −
∫ T
t
Z3sdBs;
(4.23)
with maximum condition (4.22).
In particular, if (4.22) has a unique solution
ut = h1(t,Xt, Y
1
t Y
A
t , Y
2
t , Z
P
t +X
1
t Z
A
t , Z
1
t Y
A
t , Z
3
t );
vt = h2(t,Xt, Y
1
t Y
A
t , Y
2
t , Z
P
t +X
1
t Z
A
t , Z
1
t Y
A
t , Z
3
t ),
then, by plugging (h1, h2) into (4.23) we obtain a self contained FBSDE.
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4.2.3 Fixed volatility case
If the principal has no control on v, then both v and X are fixed. In this case, along the
variation one can only choose ∆v = 0. Then (4.23) can be simplified as
Gt =
∫ t
0
g(s,Xs, us, vs)ds;
WAt = R−
∫ t
0
guY
A
s dB
u
s ;
X1t =
∫ t
0
guZ
1
sds;
Y At = ∂2U1(H(W
A
T , GT ), GT )−
∫ T
t
ZAs dB
u
s ;
Y Pt = U2(XT −H(WAT , GT ))−
∫ T
t
ZPs dB
u
s ;
Y 1t =
U ′2 −X1T∂12U1
∂1U1
−
∫ T
t
Z1sdB
u
s ;
Y 2t =
∂2U1
∂1U1
[U ′2 −X1T∂12U1] +X1T∂22U1 −
∫ T
t
Z2sdB
u
s ;
(4.24)
with maximum condition
ΓP,1t
4
= ZPt − guY 1t Y At +X1t ZAt + guuZ1t Y At + guY 2t = 0. (4.25)
4.3 Separable Utilities
In this subsection we assume the agent has a separable utility function, namely,
U1(CT , GT ) = U1(CT )−GT . (4.26)
Here we abuse the notation U1. We note that if U
′
1 > 0 and U
′′
1 ≤ 0, then Assumption A.2
(i) still holds true.
4.3.1 The agent’s problem
In this case obviously we have
Y At = −1; ZA,2t = 0.
Then (4.3) becomes
ΓAt
4
= ZA,1t − gu(t,Xt, ut, vt). (4.27)
Denote W˜At
4
= WAt +
∫ t
0
gds. Then (4.5) and (4.8) become
W˜At = U1(CT ) +
∫ T
t
[usZ
A,1
s − g]ds−
∫ T
t
ZA,1s dBs; (4.28)
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and
W˜At = U1(CT ) +
∫ T
t
[ZA,1s h(s,Xs, vs, Z
A,1
s )− g(s,Xs, h(s,Xs, vs, ZA,1s ), vs)]ds−
∫ T
t
ZA,1s dBs;
(4.29)
respectively.
4.3.2 The principal’s problem
First one can check straightforwardly that
Y A = −1; ZA = 0; Y 2 = −Y 1; Z2 = −Z1. (4.30)
Denote
J1
4
= U−11 ; W˜
A
t
4
= WAt +Gt; Y˜
3
t
4
= Y 3t −X2t . (4.31)
Then (4.12) and (4.21) become,
CT = J1(W˜
A
T ); Γ
P,1
t
4
= ZPt − guuZ1t ; ΓP,2t 4= Z3t + utY˜ 3t − gvY 1t − guvZ1t ; (4.32)
Therefore, (4.23) becomes
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
vsdBs;
W˜At = R +
∫ t
0
gds+
∫ t
0
gudB
u
s ;
Y Pt = U2(XT − J1(W˜AT ))−
∫ T
t
ZPs dB
u
s ;
Y 1t =
U ′2(XT − J1(W˜AT ))
U ′1(J1(W˜
A
T ))
−
∫ T
t
Z1sdB
u
s ;
Y˜ 3t = U
′
2(XT − J1(W˜AT ))−
∫ T
t
[gxY
1
s + guxZ
1
s ]ds−
∫ T
t
Z˜3sdB
u
s ;
(4.33)
with maximum conditions ΓP,1t = Γ
P,2
t = 0.
As mentioned in §4.2, we shall specify some sufficient conditions for the well-posedness
of the FBSDEs in this case. First, under the integrability conditions in (A5’) below, X and
W˜A are well defined. Applying Lemma 3.1 on (Y P , ZP ), (Y 1, Z1) and then on (Y˜ 3, Z˜3), we
see that (4.33) is well-posed. Therefore, FBSDEs (4.9), (4.17), and (4.19) are well-posed in
this case.
Recall (4.14) and define other ε-terms similarly. We now modify A as follows.
(A5’.) The principal’s admissible set A of controls is redefined as the set of all those
contracts (R˜, u, v) such that, for any bounded (∆u,∆v), there exists a constant ε1 > 0 such
that for any ε ∈ [0, ε1):
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(i) uε, vε,M εT , [M
ε
T ]
−1, gε, gεu, g
ε
v, g
ε
x, g
ε
uu, g
ε
uv, g
ε
ux, U
ε
1 , U
ε
2 , [U
′
2]
ε, and [J ′1]
ε are uniformly inte-
grable in Lp0(Q) or Lp0T (Q), for some p0 large enough (where J1 = U
−1
1 ).
(ii) u ∈ A(CT , v) and (CT , v) is implementable in the sense of (A4), where CT is defined
in (4.32);
Note that we may specify p0 as in (A5). But in order to simplify the presentation and
to focus on the main ideas, we assume p0 is as large as we want.
Theorem 4.3 Assume (A5’). Then (A5) holds true and the optimal R˜ is equal to R.
Proof: We first show that the principal’s optimal control R˜ is R. In fact, for fixed (u, v),
let superscript R˜ denote the processes corresponding to R˜. Then obviously W˜A,R˜t ≥ W˜A,Rt
for any R˜ ≥ R. Since
∂1J1(x) =
1
∂1U1(J1(x))
> 0, U ′2 > 0,
we get
Y P,R˜T = U2(XT − CR˜T ) = U2(XT − J1(W˜A,R˜T )) ≤ U2(XT − J1(W˜A,RT )) = Y P,RT .
Therefore,
Y P,R˜0 = E
u{Y P,R˜T } ≤ Eu{Y P,RT } = Y P,R0 .
Thus, optimal R˜ is equal to R.
It remains to prove
lim
ε→0
∇V ε2 = ∇Y P0 . (4.34)
We postpone the proof to the Appendix.
To end this subsection, for future use we note that (4.12) becomes
CT = J1
(
R +
∫ T
0
gu(t,Xt, ut, vt)dB
u
t +
∫ T
0
g(t,Xt, ut, vt)dt
)
.
This means that the principal’s problem is
sup
u,v
Eu
{
U2
(
x+
∫ T
0
utvtdt+
∫ T
0
vtdB
u
t (4.35)
−J1
(
R +
∫ T
0
gu(t,Xt, ut, vt)dB
u
t +
∫ T
0
g(t,Xt, ut, vt)dt
))}
.
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4.3.3 Fixed volatility case
If we also assume v (hence X) is fixed, then (4.33) becomes
W˜At = R +
∫ t
0
gds+
∫ t
0
gudB
u
s ;
Y Pt = U2(XT − J1(W˜AT ))−
∫ T
t
ZPs dB
u
s ;
Y 1t =
U ′2(XT − J1(W˜AT ))
U ′1(J1(W˜
A
T ))
−
∫ T
t
Z1sdB
u
s ;
(4.36)
with maximum condition ΓP,1t = 0.
5 General case: Sufficient conditions
5.1 A general result
If the necessary condition uniquely determines a candidate for the optimal solution, it is
also a sufficient condition, if an optimal solution exists. We here discuss the existence of an
optimal solution. In general, our maximization problems are non-concave, so we have to use
infinite dimensional non-convex optimization methods.
Let H be a Hilbert space with norm ‖ · ‖ and inner product < · >. Let F : H → IR be a
functional with Fre´chet derivative f : H → H. That is, for any h,∆h ∈ H,
lim
ε→0
1
ε
[F (h+ ε∆h)− F (h)] =< f(h),∆h > .
The following theorem is a direct consequence of the so-called Ekeland’s variational
principle, see Ekeland (1974).
Theorem 5.1 Assume
(A1) F is continuous;
(A2) There exists unique h∗ ∈ H such that f(h∗) = 0;
(A3) For ∀ε > 0, ∃δ > 0 such that ‖F (h)− F (h∗)‖ ≤ ε whenever ‖f(h)‖ ≤ δ.
(A4) V
4
= sup
h∈H
F (h) <∞.
Then h∗ is the maximum argument of F . That is, F (h∗) = V .
Remark 5.1 (1) A sufficient condition for (A3) is that f is invertible and f−1 is continuous
at 0.
(2) If H = IR and f is continuous and invertible, then F is either convex or concave,
and thus the result obviously holds true.
(3) If (A4) is replaced by inf
h∈H
F (h) > −∞, then h∗ is the minimum argument of F .
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5.2 Sufficient conditions for the principal-agent problem
5.2.1 The agent’s problem: Separable utility
Assume that the utility is separable, U1(C,G) = U1(C)−G. We have
WAt = E
Qu [U1(CT )−
∫ T
0
g(s,Xs, us, vs)ds] +
∫ t
0
ZA,1s dB
u
s
We define W˜A = WAt +
∫ t
0
g(s,Xs, us, vs)ds. Then, switching to Brownian Motion B, we
have
W˜At = U1(CT ) +
∫ T
t
[usZ
A,1
s − g(s,Xs, us, vs)]ds−
∫ T
t
ZA,1s dBs (5.1)
Note that W˜A0 = E
Qu [U1(CT )−
∫ T
0
g(s,Xs, us, vs)ds], so the agent’s problem is to maximize
W˜A0 over u. By the comparison theorem for BSDE’s, since U1(CT ) is fixed, from (5.1) we
see that W˜A0 will be maximized if the drift usZ
A,1
s − g(s,Xs, us, vs) is maximized, which
is the case if ZA,1s = gu(s,Xs, us, vs). This is exactly the necessary condition (4.4), taking
into account (4.27). Thus, (4.4) is also a sufficient condition for optimality for the agent’s
problem.
5.2.2 The agent’s problem: general case
We now discuss what the conditions of Theorem 5.1 boil down to. Fix (CT , v), and let H
be the set of all admissible u and
< u1, u2 >
4
= E
{∫ T
0
u1tu
2
tdt
}
. (5.2)
For the functional V1 : H → IR defined by V1(u) 4= V1(u;CT , v), by (4.2) V1 is Fre´chet
differentiable with Fre´chet derivative ΓA. More precisely, for any u, we solve (4.5) (without
assuming (4.4)) and then define ΓA(u) = ΓA by (4.3). Under technical assumptions, ΓA is a
mapping from H → H.
Moreover, we need enough assumptions to guarantee that FBSDE (4.5) is well-posed,
meaning, in particular, that V1 is continuous in u, so that (A1) would be true. We further
need that FBSDE (4.5) together with maximum condition (4.4), or equivalently FBSDE
(4.8), has a unique solution, and denote u∗ as the control corresponding to this solution.
Then (A2) would be true. To ensure (A3), we need to have, for any sequence of u,
‖ΓA(u)‖ → 0⇒ WA,u0 → WA,u
∗
0 . (5.3)
Recalling Remark 5.1 (1), we note that (5.3) can be replaced by the following stronger
conditions. Assume for any Γ, FBSDE (4.5) together with condition ΓAt = Γt has a unique
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solution and let uΓ denote the corresponding u. That is, recalling (4.6) and noting again
that ΓAt = Γt,
uΓt = h(t,Xt, vt, [Γt − ZA,1,Γt ]/Y A,Γt ]),
where (Y A,Γ, ZA,1,Γ) is the solution of the following FBSDE
GΓt =
∫ t
0
g(s,Xs, h(s,Xs, vs, [Γs − ZA,1,Γs ]/Y A,Γs ), vs)ds;
WA,Γt = U1(CT , G
Γ
T ) +
∫ T
t
ZA,1,Γs h(s,Xs, vs, [Γs − ZA,1,Γs ]/Y A,Γs )ds−
∫ T
t
ZA,1,Γs dBs;
Y A,Γt = ∂2U1(CT , G
Γ
T ) +
∫ T
t
ZA,2,Γs h(s,Xs, vs, [Γs − ZA,1,Γs ]/Y A,Γs )ds−
∫ T
t
ZA,2,Γs dBs.
(5.4)
We need that the above FBSDE is well-posed. In particular,
V1(u
Γ) = WA,Γ0 → WA,00 = V1(u∗), as ‖Γ‖ → 0. (5.5)
Then (A3) holds.
5.2.3 The principal’s problem
Here, H is the admissible set of (u, v) with
< (u1, v1), (u2, v2) >
4
= E
{∫ T
0
[u1tu
2
t + v
1
t v
2
t ]dt
}
.
The functional is V2(u, v) defined in (4.16). By (4.20) V2 is Fre´chet differentiable with Fre´chet
derivative (ΓP,1(u, v),ΓP,2(u, v)). As in §4.2.1, we need the following:
(i) Considering (u, v) as parameters, FBSDE (4.23) (without assuming (4.22)) is well-
posed;
(ii) FBSDE (4.23) together with (4.22) has a unique solution (u∗, v∗);
(iii) For any sequence of (u, v),
‖(ΓP,1(u, v),ΓP,2(u, v))‖ → 0⇒ Y P,u,v0 → Y P,u
∗,v∗
0 .
Then (u∗, v∗) is the optimal control for the principal problem.
Similarly, (iii) can be replaced by the following stronger condition:
(iii’) For any (Γ1,Γ2), FBSDE (4.23) together with condition (ΓP,1t ,Γ
P,2
t ) = (Γ
1
t ,Γ
2
t ) is
well-posed. In particular,
V2(u
Γ1,Γ2 , vΓ
1,Γ2)→ V2(u0,0, v0,0), as ‖(Γ1,Γ2)‖ → 0.
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5.2.4 Fixed volatility case
In this case v is fixed. Set H to be the admissible set of u with inner product defined by
(5.2). The functional is V2(u) with Frechet derivative Γ
P,1(u). We need the following:
(i) Considering u as a parameter, FBSDE (4.24) (without assuming (4.25)) is well-posed;
(ii) FBSDE (4.24) together with (4.25) has a unique solution u∗;
(iii) For any sequence of u,
‖ΓP,1(u)‖ → 0⇒ Y P,u0 → Y P,u
∗
0 .
Then u∗ is the optimal control of the principal’s problem.
Similarly, (iii) can be replaced by the following stronger condition:
(iii’) For any Γ, FBSDE (4.24) together with condition ΓP,1t = Γt is well-posed. In
particular,
V2(u
Γ)→ V2(u0), as ‖Γ‖ → 0.
5.3 Extension of the original Holmstrom-Milgrom problem
We now illustrate the approach above on a well known example. Assume exponential util-
ities, U1(x, y) = U1(x − y) = −e−γ1(x−y) and U2(x) = −e−γ2x. Here we abuse the notation
U1 again. In the original Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987) paper, it was also the case that v was
fixed as a given constant, but we do not assume that. The results below are obtained in
Schattler and Sung (1993) and Sung (1995) using a different approach.
For the exponential utility we have that
∂2U1(x, c) = γ1U1(x, c)
Therefore, we get, for the agent’s problem adjoint processes (4.1), that
γ1W
A
t = Y
A
t , γ1Z
A,1
t = Z
A,2
t .
Thus, the necessary condition (4.4) becomes
ZA,1t = −γ1gu(t,Xt, ut, vt)WAt . (5.6)
Therefore, the agent’s remaining utility is
WAt = U1(CT −GT ) +
∫ T
t
WAs γ1gu(s,Xs, us, vs)dB
u
s
For the optimal contract we will have WA0 = R. Therefore, we get
WAt = R exp
(
−1
2
∫ t
0
γ21g
2
u(s,Xs, us, vs)ds−
∫ t
0
γ1gu(s,Xs, us, vs)dB
u
s
)
(5.7)
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Let us first show that the condition (5.6) is also sufficient. For any given control u, since
WAt is positive, we can write
WAt = −e−γ1(CT−GT ) −
∫ T
t
WAs Z˜
A,1
s dB
u
s
where Z˜A,1 = ZA,1/WA. Denote
Y˜t = W
A
t e
γ1Gt .
We get, by switching to Brownian Motion B,
dY˜t = −e−γ1CT −
∫ T
t
Z˜A,1s Y˜sdB
u
s +
∫ T
t
[Z˜A,1s Y˜sus + γ1g(s,Xs, us, vs)Y˜s]ds. (5.8)
Note that the agent wants to maximize WA0 = Y˜0. By the BSDE Comparison Theorem,
the latter is maximized if the drift in (5.8) is maximized. We see that this will be true if
condition (5.6) is satisfied, which is then a sufficient condition.
Denote
J1(y)
4
= U−11 (y) = − log(−y)/γ1
The principal’s problem is then to maximize
EQ
u
[U2(XT − J1(WAT (u))−GT )] (5.9)
We now impose the assumption (with a slight abuse of notation) that
g(t, x, u, v) = µtx+ g(t, u, v), (5.10)
for some deterministic function µt. Doing integration by parts we get the following repre-
sentation for the first part of the cost GT :∫ T
0
µsXsds = XT
∫ T
0
µsds−
∫ T
0
∫ s
0
µudu[usvsds+ vsdB
u
s ] . (5.11)
If we substitute this into GT =
∫ T
0
µsXsds +
∫ T
0
g(s, us, vs)ds, and plug the expression
for XT and the expression (5.7) for Y˜
A into (5.9), with U2(x) = −e−γix, we get that we need
to minimize
Eu
[
exp
(
−γ2[1−
∫ T
0
µsds][X0 +
∫ T
0
utvtdt] + γ2γ1
∫ T
0
g2u(s, us, vs)
2
ds
+γ2
∫ T
0
g(s, us, vs)ds− γ2
∫ T
0
[
∫ s
0
µrdr]usvsds− γ2[1−
∫ T
0
µsds]
∫ T
0
vsdB
u
s
+γ2
∫ T
0
gu(s, us, vs)dB
u
s − γ2
∫ T
0
[
∫ s
0
µrdr]vsdB
u
s
)]
. (5.12)
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This is a standard stochastic control problem, for which the solution turns out to be de-
terministic processes uˆ, vˆ (as can be verified, once the solution is found, by verifying the
corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation). Assuming that u, v are deterministic,
the expectation above can be computed by using the fact that
Eu[exp(
∫ T
0
fsdB
u
s )] = exp(
1
2
∫ T
0
f 2s ds)
for a given square-integrable deterministic function f . Then, the minimization can be done
inside the integral in the exponent, and boils down to minimizing over (ut, vt) the expression
−
[
1−
∫ T
t
µsds
]
utvt + γ1
g2u(t, ut, vt)
2
+ g(t, ut, vt)
+
γ2
2
{[
1−
∫ T
t
µsds
]
vt − gu(t, ut, vt)
}2
. (5.13)
The optimal contract is found from (4.12), as:
CT = GT − 1
γ1
log(−WAT )
where WA should be written not in terms of the Brownian Motion Bu, but in the terms of
the process X. Since we have
WAt = R exp
(
−
∫ t
0
γ21g
2
u(s, us, vs)/2ds+
∫ t
0
γ1usgu(s, us, vs)ds−
∫ t
0
γ1gu(s, us, vs)dBs
)
(5.14)
we get that the optimal contract can be written as (assuming optimal vt is strictly positive)
CT = c+
∫ T
0
µsXsds+
∫ T
0
gu(s, us, vs)
vs
dXs
for some constant c. If µ ≡ 0 and gu(s,us,vs)
vs
is a constant, then we get a linear contract.
Let us consider the special case of Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987), with
v ≡ 1 , g(t, x, u, v) = u2/2.
Then (5.13) becomes
−ut + γ1u2t/2 + u2t/2 +
γ2
2
{1− ut}2 .
Minimizing this we get constant optimal u of Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987), given by
uˆ =
1 + γ2
1 + γ1 + γ2
The optimal contract is linear, and given by CT = a+ bXT , where b = uˆ and a is such that
the IR constraint is satisfied,
a = − 1
γ1
log(−R)− bX0 + b
2T
2
(γ1 − 1) . (5.15)
Note that in the limit when γi → 0 we get the case corresponding to the linear utility
function Ui(x) = x.
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6 Conclusion
We provide a new solvable case of Principal-Agent problems with general utility functions
and hidden action in models driven by Brownian Motion, which leads to nonlinear contracts.
We then formulate a general theory leading to the necessary conditions for the optimal
solution. However, the question of the existence of an optimal solution remains open. We
analyze both the agent and the principal’s problem in weak formulation, thus having a
consistent framework.
7 Appendix
In this appendix we provide the remaining proofs.
7.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
We first assume ξ is bounded. Then MuT ξ ∈ L2T (Q). Let (Y˜ , Z˜) be the unique solution to
the BSDE
Y˜t =M
u
T ξ −
∫ T
t
Z˜sdBs.
Define
Yt
4
= Y˜t[M
u
t ]
−1, Zt
4
= [Z˜t − utY˜t][Mut ]−1.
One can check directly that
dYt = ZtdB
u
t , YT = ξ.
Moreover,
Yt = Et{MuT ξ}[Mut ]−1 = Eut {ξ},
which implies that
Eu{ sup
0≤t≤T
|Yt|2} ≤ CEu{|ξ|2} <∞.
Then one can easily get Z ∈ L2(Qu).
In general, assume ξn are bounded and E
u{|ξn → ξ|2} → 0. Let (Y n, Zn) be the solution
to BSDE (3.1) with terminal condition ξn. Then
Eu
{
sup
0≤t≤T
|Y nt − Y mt |2 +
∫ T
0
|Znt − Zmt |2dt
}
≤ CEu{|ξn − ξm|2} → 0.
Therefore, (Y n, Zn) converges to some (Y, Z) which satisfies (3.1).
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7.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We first show that
Lemma 7.1 For any u ∈ A1, we have
E
{
e2
∫ T
0 |ut|2dt
}
<∞; (7.1)
and thus Girsanov Theorem holds for u.
Proof. Denote
τn
4
= inf{t :
∫ t
0
|us|2ds+ |
∫ t
0
usdBs| > n} ∧ T.
Then τn ↑ T . Moreover,
e
∫ τn
0 utdBt =Muτne
1
2
∫ τn
0 |ut|2dt.
Squaring both sides and taking the expectation, we get
E
{
e2
∫ τn
0 |ut|2dt
}
= E
{
|Muτn|2e
∫ τn
0 |ut|2dt
}
≤ [E{|Muτn |4}]
1
2
[
E
{
e2
∫ τn
0 |ut|2dt
}] 1
2
.
Thus
E
{
e2
∫ τn
0 |ut|2dt
}
≤ E{|Muτn |4} ≤ E{|MuT |4} <∞.
Letting n→∞ we get (7.1).
We now show that BSDE (3.2) is wellposed and uˆ ∈ A1. First, by Definition 3.2 (i), we
can solve the following linear BSDE
Y¯t = e
U1(CT ) −
∫ T
t
Z¯sdBs.
Define
uˆt
4
=
Z¯t
Y¯t
.
Then (Y¯ , uˆ) satisfies (3.2).
Since Y¯t > 0 is continuous, and E{
∫ T
0
|Z¯t|2dt} < ∞, we know uˆ satisfies Definition 3.1
(i). Moreover, by straightforward calculation (or recall (3.11)) we have
M uˆT = [Y¯0]
−1eU1(CT ).
Thus, by Definition 3.2 (i),
E{|M uˆT |4} = [Y¯0]−4E{e4U1(CT )} <∞.
Therefore, uˆ ∈ A1.
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7.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Under our assumptions (3.14) becomes
CT +
1
U ′1(CT )
= XT + λ.
we know CT = c(XT ) for some deterministic function c. Then by Remark 3.1 we know
ut = u(t,Xt) and (3.5)-(3.6) hold true with v(t, x) = σtx. Note that
ux(t, x) =
σt
F 2
[
FxF + x(FFxx − F 2x )
]
(t, x).
Without loss of generality, we prove the result only at t = 0.
Denote
Xxt = x+
∫ t
0
σsX
x
s dBs; ∇Xt = 1 +
∫ t
0
σs∇XsdBs.
Then
∇XT = XT
x
;
and
F (0, x) = E{eU1(c(XxT ))};
Fx(0, x) = E
{
eU1(c(X
x
T ))U ′1(c(X
x
T ))c
′(XxT )∇XT
}
;
Fxx(0, x) = E
{
eU1(c(X
x
T ))
[
|U ′1(c(XxT ))c′(XxT )∇XT |2
+U ′′1 (c(X
x
T ))|c′(XxT )∇XT |2 + U ′1(c(XxT ))c′′(XxT )|∇XT |2
]}
.
Thus, by suppressing the variables,
ux(0, x) =
σ0
F 2
[
FFx + x[FFxx − F 2x ]
]
(0, x)
≥ σ0
F 2
[
FE
{
eU1U ′1c
′∇XT
}
+ xFE
{
eU1 [U ′′1 |c′|2 + U ′1c′′]|∇XT |2
}
=
σ0
xF
E
{
eU1
[
U ′1c
′XT + [U ′′1 |c′|2 + U ′1c′′]|XT |2
]}
.
Note that
c′(x) =
|U ′1|2
|U ′1|2 − U ′′1
> 0;
c′′(x) =
|U ′1|2U ′′′1 − 2U ′1|U ′′1 |2
[|U ′1|2 − U ′′1 ]2
c′ =
U ′1U
′′′
1 − 2|U ′′1 |2
[|U ′1|2 − U ′′1 ]U ′1
|c′|2.
Then
U ′′1 |c′|2 + U ′1c′′ =
|U ′1|2U ′′1 + U ′1U ′′′1 − 3|U ′′1 |2
|U ′1|2 − U ′′1
|c′|2 = |c
′|2
|U ′1|2 − U ′′1
H1(c(XT )).
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Denote y = c(XT ). If H1(y) ≥ 0, then, combining the fact that XT > 0,
U ′1c
′XT + [U ′′1 |c′|2 + U ′1c′′]|XT |2 ≥ 0.
We now assume H1(y) < 0, then H2(y) ≥ 0. Since λ ≥ 0, we have
0 < XT ≤ XT + λ = y + 1
U ′1(y)
.
Thus
U ′1(c(XT ))c
′(XT )XT + [U ′′1 (c(XT )|c′(XT )|2 + U ′1(XT )c′′(XT )]|XT |2
= U ′1(c(XT ))c
′(XT )XT +
H1
|U ′1|2 − U ′′1
(y)|c′(XT )|2|XT |2
≥ U ′1(c(XT ))c′(XT )XT +
H1
|U ′1|2 − U ′′1
(y)|c′(XT )|2XT (XT + λ)
= |c′|2XT
[ |U ′1|2 − U ′′1
U ′1
(y) +
H1
|U ′1|2 − U ′′1
(y)[y +
1
U ′1(y)
]
]
=
|c′|2XT
U ′1[|U ′1|2 − U ′′1 ]
H2(y) ≥ 0.
So in both cases, we have
U ′1c
′XT + [U ′′1 |c′|2 + U ′1c′′]|XT |2 ≥ 0.
Thus ux(0, x) ≥ 0.
7.4 Proof of Theorem 4.1
By (A3)(iii), one can easily show that
sup
ε∈[0,ε0)
E
{∫ T
0
[|gε(t)|4 + |gεu(t)|4]dt+ |GεT |4 + |M εT |4
}
<∞, (7.2)
and
lim
²→0
E
{∫ T
0
[|gε(t)− g(t)|4 + |gεu(t)− gu(t)|4]dt+ |GεT −GT |4 + |M εT −MT |4
}
= 0. (7.3)
Lemma 7.2 We have
lim
²→0
E
{∫ T
0
[|∇gε(t)−∇g(t)|4]dt+ |∇GεT −∇GT |4 + |∇M εT −∇MT |2
}
= 0.
42
Proof. First, note that ∇gε(t) =
∫ 1
0
gδεu (t)dδ∆ut. Then
|∇gε(t)−∇g(t)| ≤ |∆ut|
∫ 1
0
|gδεu (t)− gu(t)|dδ.
By (7.3) we get
lim
²→0
E
{∫ T
0
|∇gε(t)−∇g(t)|4dt
}
= 0. (7.4)
Similarly,
lim
²→0
E{|∇GεT −∇GT |4} = 0.
Second, noting that M εT = exp(
∫ T
0
uεtdBt − 12
∫ T
0
|uεt |2dt) we have
∇M εT =
∫ 1
0
M δεT [
∫ T
0
∆utdBt −
∫ T
0
(ut + δε∆ut)∆utdt]dδ.
Then
E{|∇M εT −∇MT |2} = E
{∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
[(
M δεT
∫ T
0
∆utdBt −MT
∫ T
0
∆utdBt
)
−
(
M δεT
∫ T
0
(ut + δε∆ut)∆utdt−MT
∫ T
0
ut∆utds
)]
dδ
∣∣∣2}
≤ C
∫ 1
0
E
{
|M δεT −MT |2|
∫ T
0
∆utdBt|2
+|M δεT −MT |2|
∫ T
0
(ut + δε∆ut)∆utdt|2
+|MT |2|
∫ T
0
[(ut + δε∆ut)∆ut − ut∆ut)]dt|2
}
dδ
≤ C
∫ 1
0
[√
E{|M δεT −MT |4}
+
√
E{|M δεT −MT |4}
√∫ T
0
E{|(ut + δε∆ut)|4}dt
+E{|MT |2}ε2
]
dδ.
Then by (7.3) and Assumption A3 (iii) we prove the result.
To prove the theorem, we also need the following simple lemma (see, e.g., Cvitanic´, Wan
and Zhang (2006)):
Lemma 7.3 Assume Wt =
∫ t
0
αsdBs + At is a continuous semimartingale, where B is a
Brownian motion. Suppose that
1)
∫ T
0
|αt|2dt <∞ a.s.
2) Both Wt and At are uniformly (in t) integrable.
Then E[WT ] = E[AT ].
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We now show (4.2). The first equality can be written as
lim
²→0
∇V ε1 = E
{
∇MTU1 +MT∂2U1∇GT
}
. (7.5)
Note that we have
∇V ε1 =
V ε1 − V1
ε
= E
[
∇M εTU ε1 +MT U
ε
1−U1
ε
]
(7.6)
As for the limit of the first term on the right-hand side, we can write
∇M εTU ε1 −∇MTU1 = [∇M εT −∇MT ]U1 +∇M εT [U ε1 − U1].
By Assumption A3 (iii) and the above L2 bounds on ∇M εT , this is integrable uniformly with
respect to ε, so the expected value (under Q) converges to zero, which is what we need.
As for the limit of the second term in the right side of (7.6), notice that we have
MT lim
²→0
U ε1 − U1
ε
=MT∂2U1∇GT . (7.7)
We want to prove the uniform integrability again. We note that∣∣∣∣U ε1 − U1ε
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∫ 1
0
∂2U1 (CT , GT + θ (G
ε
T −GT )) dθ
∣∣∣∣ |∇GεT |
≤ {|∂2U1 (CT , GT )|+ |∂2U1 (CT , GεT )|} |∇GεT |
where the last inequality is due to monotonicity of ∂2U1.
Therefore, we get∣∣∣∣MT U ε1 − U1ε
∣∣∣∣ ≤ C {|∂2U1 (CT , GT )|2 + |∂2U1 (CT , GεT )|2 + |∇GεT |4 + |MT |4}
Thus, from Assumption A3 (iii), the left-hand side is uniformly integrable, and the expec-
tations of the terms in (7.7) also converge, and we finish the proof of (7.5).
We now want to prove the second equality of (4.2). We have
∇V1 = E
{
∇MTU1 +MT∂2U1∇GT
}
= E
{
MTU1
∫ T
0
∆utdB
u
t +MT∂2U1
∫ T
0
gu∆utdt
}
= Eu
{
WAT
∫ T
0
∆utdB
u
t + Y
A
T
∫ T
0
gu∆utdt
}
= Eu
{∫ T
0
ΓAt ∆utdt+
∫ T
0
ΓBt dB
u
t
}
, (7.8)
where
ΓAt
4
= ZA,1t + gu(t,Xt, ut, vt)Y
A
t , Γ
B
t
4
= WAt ∆us + Z
A,1
t
∫ t
0
∆usdB
u
s + Z
A,2
t ∇Gt
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and the last equality is obtained from Itoˆ’s rule, and definitions of Y A,i, ZA,i. We need to
show
Eu
∫ T
0
ΓBt dB
u
t = 0
We want to use Lemma 7.3 in the last two lines of (7.8), with α = ΓB and
Wt = W
A
t
∫ t
0
∆usdB
u
s + Y
A
t
∫ t
0
gu(s)∆usds
At =
∫ t
0
ΓAs ∆usds
From the BSDE theory and our assumptions we have
Eu
{
sup
0≤t≤T
(|WAt |2 + |Y At |2) +
∫ T
0
(|ZA,1t |2 + |ZA,2t |2)dt
}
<∞. (7.9)
From this it is easily verified that ∫ T
0
∣∣ΓBt ∣∣2 dt <∞
so that condition 1) of the lemma is satisfied. Next, we have
Eu
{
sup
0≤t≤T
|Wt|
}
≤ CEu
[
sup
0≤t≤T
{|WAt |2 + |Y At |2+}+ ∫ T
0
|gu(t)|2dt
]
≤ C + CE
{
M2T +
∫ T
0
|gu(t)|4dt
}
<∞,
thanks to (7.9) and (7.2). Moreover,
Eu
{
sup
0≤t≤T
|At|
}
= Eu
{
sup
0≤t≤T
|
∫ t
0
[ZA,1s + gu(s)Y
A
s ]∆usds|
}
≤ CE
{
MT
∫ T
0
|ZA,1t + gu(s)Y As |dt
}
≤ CE
{
|MT |4 +
∫ T
0
[|ZA,1t |2 + |gu(t)|4 + |Y At |2]dt
}
<∞
The last two bounds ensure that condition 2) of the lemma is satisfied, so that the last term
in (7.8) is zero, and we finish the proof of (4.2).
Finally, (4.4) follows directly from (4.2) if u is optimal, as ∆ut is arbitrary.
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7.5 Proof of Theorem 4.2
First the necessity of (4.22) is obvious because (∆u,∆v) is arbitrary.
Note that
∇Xt =
∫ t
0
∆vsdB
u
s +
∫ t
0
us∆vsds.
Applying Lemma 7.3 repeatedly, we have
E
{
[∂1U1∇CT + ∂2U1∇GT ]Y 1T
}
= E{∇WAT Y 1T }
= E
{∫ T
0
Y 1t guY
A
t ∆utdt−
∫ T
0
Z1t [gu∇Y At + Y At ∇gu]dt
}
= E
{∫ T
0
Y 1t guY
A
t ∆utdt−
∫ T
0
Z1t Y
A
t ∇gudt−
∫ T
0
X1t Z
A
t ∆utdt
−X1T [∂12U1∇CT + ∂22U1∇GT ]
}
,
Note that
∂1U1Y
1
T +X
1
T∂12U1 = U
′
2.
Then
E{U ′2∇CT} = E
{∫ T
0
Y 1t guY
A
t ∆utdt−
∫ T
0
Z1t Y
A
t ∇gudt
−
∫ T
0
X1t Z
A
t ∆utdt− [X1T∂22U1 + Y 1T ∂2U1]∇GT ]
}
.
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Therefore,
∇Y P0 = E
{
U ′2[∇XT −∇CT ] +
∫ T
0
ZPt ∆utdt
}
= E
{
U ′2∇XT +
∫ T
0
ZPt ∆utdt+ [X
1
T∂22U1 + Y
1
T ∂2U1]∇GT
−
∫ T
0
[
[guY
1
t Y
A
t −X1t ZAt ]∆ut − Z1t Y At ∇gu
]
dt
}
= E
{∫ T
0
[ZPt − guY 1t Y At +X1t ZAt + guuZ1t Y At + guY 2t ]∆utdt
+
∫ T
0
[guvZ
1
t Y
A
t + gvY
2
t ]∆vtdt
+
∫ T
0
[guxZ
1
t Y
A
t + gxY
2
t ]∇Xtdt+ U ′2∇XT
}
= E
{∫ T
0
[ZPt − guY 1t Y At +X1t ZAt + guuZ1t Y At + guY 2t ]∆utdt
+
∫ T
0
[guvZ
1
t Y
A
t + gvY
2
t ]∆vtdt+ Y
3
T∇XT
}
= E
{∫ T
0
[ZPt − guY 1t Y At +X1t ZAt + guuZ1t Y At + guY 2t ]∆utdt
+
∫ T
0
[guvZ
1
t Y
A
t + gvY
2
t + Z
3
t + (Y
3
t −X2t )ut]∆vtdt
}
= E
{∫ T
0
ΓP,1t ∆utdt+
∫ T
0
ΓP,2t ∆vtdt
}
.
The proof is complete.
7.6 Proof of Theorem 4.3
We have already shown that we can set R˜ = R. Recall that
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
vsdBs;
Mt = exp
(∫ t
0
usdBs − 1
2
∫ t
0
|us|2ds
)
;
W˜At = R +
∫ t
0
gds−
∫ t
0
usguds+
∫ t
0
gudBs;
Y Pt = U2(XT − J1(W˜AT )) +
∫ T
t
usZ
P
s ds−
∫ T
t
ZPs dBs;
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and that 
∇Xt =
∫ t
0
∆vsdBs;
∇Mt =Mt[
∫ t
0
∆usdBs −
∫ t
0
us∆usds];
∇ϕ = ϕu∆ut + ϕv∆vt + ϕx∇Xt, ϕ = g, gu;
∇W˜At =
∫ t
0
∇gds−
∫ t
0
[gu∆us + us∇gu]ds+
∫ t
0
∇gudBs;
∇Y Pt = U ′2(XT − J1(W˜AT ))[∇XT −
∇W˜AT
U ′1(J1(W˜
A
T ))
]
+
∫ T
t
[ZPs ∆us + us∇ZPs ]ds−
∫ T
t
∇ZPs dBs;
To prove (4.34), we need the following result. For any random variable ξ and any p > 0,
Eu
ε{|ξ|p} = E{MuεT |ξ|p} ≤
√
E{|MuεT |2}
√
E{|ξ|2p} ≤ C√E{|ξ|2p};
E{|ξ|p} = Euε{[MuεT ]−1|ξ|p} ≤
√
Euε{[MuεT ]−2}
√
Euε{|ξ|2p}
=
√
E{[MuεT ]−1}
√
Euε{|ξ|2p} ≤ C√Euε{|ξ|2p}.
(7.10)
Proof of (4.34): In this proof we use a generic constant p ≥ 1 to denote the powers,
which may vary from line to line. We assume all the involved powers are always less than
or equal to the p0 in (A5’).
First, one can easily show that
lim
ε→0
E
{
sup
0≤t≤T
[|Xεt −Xt|p + |M εt −Mt|p + |W˜At − W˜At |p] +
∫ T
0
[|gε − g|p + |gεu − gu|p]dt
}
= 0.
Using the arguments in Lemma 3.1 we have
Eu
ε
{
[
∫ T
0
|ZP,εt |2dt]p
}
≤ C <∞,
which, by applying (7.10) twice, implies that
Eu
{
[
∫ T
0
|ZP,εt |2dt]p
}
≤ C <∞.
Note that
Y P,εt − Y Pt = U ε2 − U2 +
∫ T
t
[
ε∆usZ
P,ε
s + us[Z
P,ε
s − ZPs ]
]
ds−
∫ T
t
[ZP,εs − ZPs ]dBs
= U ε2 − U2 + ε
∫ T
t
∆usZ
P,ε
s ds−
∫ T
t
[ZP,εs − ZPs ]dBus .
Using the arguments in Lemma 3.1 again we get
lim
ε→0
Eu
{
sup
0≤t≤T
|Y P,εt − Y Pt |p + [
∫ T
0
|ZP,εt − ZPt |2dt]p
}
= 0,
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which, together with (7.10), implies that
lim
ε→0
E
{
sup
0≤t≤T
|Y P,εt − Y Pt |p + [
∫ T
0
|ZP,εt − ZPt |2dt]p
}
= 0. (7.11)
Next, recall (4.14) one can easily show that
lim
ε→0
E
{
sup
0≤t≤T
[|∇Xεt −∇Xt|p + |∇M εt −∇Mt|p + |∇W˜At −∇W˜At |p]
+
∫ T
0
[|∇gε −∇g|p + |∇gεu −∇gu|p]dt
}
= 0.
Then similar to (7.11) one can prove that
lim
ε→0
E
{
sup
0≤t≤T
|∇Y P,εt −∇Y Pt |p
}
= 0.
In particular,
lim
ε→0
∇V ε2 = lim
ε→0
∇Y P,ε0 = ∇Y P0 .
The proof is complete.
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